Deterrent for unmanned aerial systems

ABSTRACT

A system for providing integrated detection and deterrence against an unmanned vehicle including but not limited to aerial technology unmanned systems using a detection element, a tracking element, an identification element and an interdiction or deterrent element. Elements contain sensors that observe real time quantifiable data regarding the object of interest to create an assessment of risk or threat to a protected area of interest. This assessment may be based e.g., on data mining of internal and external data sources. The deterrent element selects from a variable menu of possible deterrent actions. Though designed for autonomous action, a Human in the Loop may override the automated system solutions.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.17/828,754, filed May 31, 2022, now U.S. Pat. No. ______; which is acontinuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 17/214,413, filed Mar.26, 2021, now U.S. Pat. No. 11,378,651; which is a continuation of U.S.patent application Ser. No. 16/876,387, filed May 18, 2020, now U.S.Pat. No. 11,035,929; which is a continuation of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 16/183,935, filed Nov. 8, 2018; now U.S. Pat. No. 10,670,696;which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/627,229filed Jun. 19, 2017; now U.S. Pat. No. 10,156,631; which is acontinuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/368,269 filed Dec.2, 2016, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,715,009; which is a continuation-in-part ofU.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/821,907 filed Aug. 10, 2015, nowU.S. Pat. No. 9,689,976; which claims benefit of U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 62/094,154 filed Dec. 19, 2014. The disclosures of eachof these prior applications are incorporated herein in their entirety byreference.

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

None.

FIELD

The technology herein relates to reliable detection and interdiction ofunmanned aerial systems such as drones.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), weighing less than 20 kg or 55pounds, which are commonly referred to as “drones”, are commerciallyavailable to the general public. Drone—designated as 44 in FIG. 1A, thusrefers to an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote control oronboard computers, allowing for human correction (i.e.,semi-autonomous), or autonomous, see also UAV, UAS, sUAS, RPA. Whilethere may be many safe commercial and recreational uses for unmannedaerial systems, recent publicized events tell us that significanthazards exist to commercial and general aviation, public, private andgovernment interests even if a drone is operated without maliciousintent. Furthermore, unmanned aerial systems have been usedintentionally to violate the privacy of personal, commercial,educational, athletic, entertainment and governmental activities. Anunintended consequence of off-the-shelf (OTS) commercially availableunmanned aerial systems is the capability to be used in the furtheranceof invading privacy, or carrying out terrorist and/or criminalactivities. There is a genuine need for an integrated system and methodof detecting, tracking, identifying/classifying and deterring theapproach of a commercial unmanned aerial system towards a location wherepersonal, public, commercial, educational, athletic, entertainment,governmental and military activities occur and where a commercialunmanned aerial system could potentially be used for invading privacy,or carrying out terrorist and criminal activities within a civilianenvironment.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows an example of non-limiting drone detection, classificationand interdiction system.

FIG. 1A is a schematic representation of the components and function ofan example non-limiting integrated detection and countermeasure systemfor use against small-unmanned aerial systems (sUAS).

FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of the deterrent and countermeasuresystem for use against small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), 44 of FIG.1A.

FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of the Radio Frequency (RF)detection system for use against small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS),44 of FIG. 1A.

FIG. 4 is a schematic representation of the Radar detection system andElectro Optical/Infer Red (EO/IR) camera & Laser Range Finder (LRF)system for use against small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), 44 of FIG.1A.

FIG. 5 is a simplified flow-chart showing computational processes andfunctions that locate, identify/classify, track and deter a smallunmanned aerial system (sUAS), 44 of FIG. 1A in an automated manner.

FIG. 6 is an example non-limiting process diagram for an embodiment ofthe sensor fusion processor.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE NON-LIMITING EMBODIMENTS

FIG. 1 shows an example non-limiting system for detecting, tracking,classifying and interdicting a UAS such as a drone 44. In the exampleshown, several different sensors using different technologies are usedto detect the target 44. Such sensors include, in one non-limitingembodiment, a commercial ground based radar 43; an optical and/orinfrared and/or laser range finder 16; an omnidirectional radiofrequency (RF) receiving antenna 14; and a directional radio frequency(RF) receiving/direction finding antenna 12. Such equipment can bemounted on separate fixtures such as mobile trailers, or on the samefixture or other structure. The outputs of these sensors are analyzedusing a sensor fusion processor (described below) to detect and classifythe target 44, and to determine a level of threat assessment. In somenon-limiting embodiments, a human can be in the loop (HiL or “human inthe loop”) to render judgment; in other scenarios, the system isentirely automatic enabled by algorithms applying data mining. If thethreat assessment level exceeds a certain threshold, the system canautomatically deploy interdiction 10 to incapacitate or destroy thetarget 44. The system can therefore be instrumental in protectingcritical infrastructure such as airports, bridges, power lines,factories, nuclear/power plants, shipping facilities, football stadiums,military installations, large public venues, etc., from being threatenedby the target 44.

Example non-limiting embodiments provide a fully integratedmulti-phenomenology detection and interdiction solution which leveragesthe strength of multiple individual sensor systems including but notlimited to: Radar, Radio Frequency Direction Finding (DF), ElectroOptical and Infra-Red (EO/IR) imagers, and Laser Range Finding (LRF),used to derive necessary location and spectral characteristics of acommercial unmanned aerial system (UAS) or drone. Unique analyticprocesses and algorithms use the data collected by the sensor suite toidentify, classify and specify the specific waveform, pulse width, andfrequency to be generated for use by an RF counter-measure, therebyexploiting inherent vulnerabilities within the onboard electroniccontrols of an object of interest such as a sUAS—designated as 44 inFIG. 1 small Unmanned Aerial System, usually weighing less than 20 kg or55 lbs. The highly accurate, narrow beam RF counter-measure transmitsthe specifically generated RF signal, disrupting and overwhelming thesubject unmanned systems control and navigation systems resulting in anairborne unmanned system landing or returning to launch location basedon the subject's onboard processes.

Traditionally, air defense has been the purview of the military, not lawenforcement or private security forces. However, the advent ofaffordable and capable sUAS, weighing less than 20 kg or 55 pounds,creates a need to detect and deter unauthorized or hostile use of thistechnology. Small drone systems present different detection signatures,flight characteristics and profiles, and are not likely to be detectedby more conventional radar or deterred by electronic countermeasures, orkinetic systems without the risk of significant collateral damage.Existing UAS countermeasure systems are designed primarily and focus ondetecting and destroying larger aircraft such as drones similar to theIranian Ababil 3, Chinese Sky-09P and the Russian ZALA 421-08 forexample. These midsize to large unmanned aerial vehicles are not likelyto be used within a domestic, non-combat, environment. Due to their sizeand flight characteristics, detecting and tracking midsize to largemilitary drones is accomplished with great success using traditionalmilitary radar/air defense systems designed to scan the sky. Inaddition, the military countermeasures used to combat UAS/UAVs againstfriendly positions consist of lethal offensive systems armed with deadlyand destructive munitions such as bullets, artillery, electromagneticand laser beams. Also integrated in the military countermeasures arepowerful RF systems designed to disrupt, jam or spoof the SATNAV (GPS)(satellite navigation/global positioning system) signals needed foraerial navigation. This traditional approach produces a high risk ofcollateral damage or negative navigation effects on all GPS receiversoperating in the area. The system of the non-limiting embodiments(s)resolves these negative or collateral effects by offering a precise andtailored application of the specific RF emission needed to remotelycontrol these small commercial drones without specifically targeting theSATNAV (GPS) signal.

Military UAS countermeasures are designed and used in a battlefield orhostile environment. Using a military solution within a civilian orcommercial environment would not be suitable or permissible due to theinherent liabilities and government regulations. Furthermore, the use ofSATNAV/GPS jamming and spoofing can severely disrupt broad military andcivilian activities such as cell phone towers and aviation navigationmaking it illegal outside of a military operation or combat zone.Another issue with using current military UAS/UAV countermeasuresagainst commercial drones is the military focus on traditional forceprotection and counter battery missions using battlefield radar systemsthat are not designed for or capable of detecting slow moving targetsthat operate at relatively low angles or altitudes above buildings,trees and just above the horizon. Using countermeasure systems that relyonly on aircraft detecting radar and GPS jamming/spoofing systems doesnot provide a viable defensive solution to commercially available sUAS.The full military approach to UAS countermeasure system has severaldrawbacks with its use in a civilian or commercial environment thatincludes cost, weight, size, power consumption and collateral effectsusing high-powered RF jamming or kinetic technologies. This gap betweenthe military and civilian operational environment demands that anintegrated, multi-sensor counter sUAS system be developed. The demandfor a successful counter sUAS system that detects, tracks,identifies/classifies and deters against commercial drones withoutcausing collateral damage or interference in a civilian environment isgrowing exponentially and is directly applicable to other unmannedsystems employing similar technology.

The exemplary non-limiting implementations herein alleviate the problemsnoted with the military counter UAS systems and provide a novel,efficient and effective integrated detection, tracking,identifying/classifying and countermeasure solution against smallunmanned aerial systems (sUAS) operating in a commercial or civilianenvironment. The implementations herein further offer increasedawareness, security, privacy, and protection from the threats involvingsmall unmanned aerial systems/vehicles, (sUAS/UAV) or other similarmanned systems-such as ultra-light aircraft, and is applicable togovernmental, military, commercial, private, and public concerns.Example embodiments herein provide Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems ofSystems (CUASs2) to detect, identify/classify, track and deter orinterdict small unmanned aerial vehicles or systems

The example non-limiting systems disclosed herein provide an integratedsolution providing protection from ground level to several thousand feetabove ground level and laterally several miles comprising componentsusing in part: some existing technologies for a new use; multiplexinghardware components designed for this application; development of theintegrating sophisticated built-in software algorithms which calculatesthe exact X, Y, Z (Longitude, Latitude and Altitude) coordinates of thesubject sUAS; subject sUAS RF signal analysis to determine the mostappropriate RF signal characteristics required to affect the subjectsUAS; video/photo analytics to identify/classify sUAS type and threatassessment, precision alignment of high definition electro-optical (EO)sensors and infrared (IR) sensors and image recognition algorithms; aLaser Range Finder (LRF) capable of tracking multiple targets, providingX, Y, Z coordinate data, heads-up display data and a fire-controlcapability. Such capability allows for operation in a completelyautonomous manner or in a supervised manner by providing a systemoperator, also known as a Human-in-the loop (HiL), a real-time imageryand data to assist in picture compilation and threat assessment as wella visual display of the suspect sUAS location and image, thus, providingpositive confirmation that the targeted sUAS/UAV is in violation ofairspace authorization, presents a physical threat to an area of concernor has entered a designated protected area.

Operating a counter sUAS system within a civilian or commercialenvironment will mandate precision countermeasures to ensure veryminimal to zero collateral damage or exposure to areas surrounding thetargeted sUAS. The non-limiting embodiments(s) unique capability is theway it integrates multiple sensors to detect, track, identify/classifyand deter sUAS/UAV systems. In addition, the system utilizes threeindependent sources to acquire the X, Y and Z coordinate data needed toautomatically direct and align the automatic antenna alignment systemand provide the initial targeting/tracking data to the EO/IR system (16)and the countermeasure system (10). The three independent sources arethe radar system (43), the DF system (14) and the combined EO/IR & LRFsystem (16). Combining the independent X, Y, and Z coordinate data ofeach system will provide a precise 8-digit GPS geo-location/tracking touse in the geo-location, mapping, aiming and tracking systems. It shouldbe noted that the military systems rely only on radar for GPS locationwhen tracking a suspected airborne target or UAV.

The example non-limiting technology herein utilizes radar in the X-Bandfrequency range as one of the sensors to detect, track and classify acommercial sUAS/UAV. The unique application of radar more typically usedto detect ground targets allows greater discrimination between thesuspect sUAS and the highly cluttered, low altitude environment.Military air defense radars are optimized for much higher altitude andvelocity targets utilizing the K and Ka bands. Existing art approachesthe technical challenge of sUAS detection like any other aerial targetwhile the non-limiting embodiments(s) described approaches thischallenge as if it were a ground target. This fundamentally differentapproach provides a novel and unique solution for the detection ofairborne sUAS or similar signature systems. Due to the high frequency,range, power, and other optimized characteristics, typical applicationsof aircraft detection radars are more susceptible to distortion whenviewing ground-associated objects that is then classified as “Clutter”.

The example non-limiting technology herein utilizes a Laser Range Finder(LRF) coupled with an Electrical Optic and Infra-Red (EO/IR) camerasystem as one of the sensors to detect, track, and identify/classify acommercial sUAS/UAV. The EO/IR & LRF system (16) receives its initialtarget data (location) from the radar system (43). The X, Y and Zcoordinate data from the radar aligns the EO/IR camera and LRF towardsthe suspect sUAS target. The LRF is a comprehensive, multi-purposetargeting system that incorporates the same tracking and fire-controlcapabilities found in advanced military weapon systems including fighteraircraft, armored vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. The LRFcombined with the EO/IR camera system provides the digital display tothe system operator, (HIL), that shows the field of view and displaysthe suspect sUAS target(s) along with vital pieces of data includingrange-to-target, target velocity, deterrent angle, compass heading, windvelocity and direction, deterrent zone size, countermeasure type,temperature, barometric pressure and time of day. Fire controltechnology is at the core of the LRF and ensures extreme accuracies atlong distances with slow to fast moving sUAS targets. It is what allowsthe non-limiting embodiments(s) to execute precision countermeasureswithin a controlled civilian or commercial environment. Fire controlsystems are basically computers that guide the release of the chosencountermeasure. Once the suspect sUAS is tagged the LRF produces an X, Yand Z data point that is sent to the countermeasure system (14) forautomatic alignment of the destructive or non-destructive deterrentelement (10), (RF, Laser, Impulse, Munitions, etc.). This is asignificant advantage over current military systems for providing thenecessary steps for increased safety when operating in acivilian/commercial environment. During the time that the suspect sUASis being viewed through the EO/IR camera system, data mining techniquesbased on internal and external databases are used to compare the imagesand heat signatures with known sUAS images and heat signatures forpossible type identification/classification and threat assessment.Video/photo analytics are used to determine the type of sUAS and if thesuspect sUAS contains a payload.

The example non-limiting technology herein utilizes components of theLRF to connect the tracking EO/IR optic with the fire control trigger.Targeting technology lets you designate an exact sUAS target(s) byplacing the aligned reticle on the sUAS and then pressing the tagbutton. When you tag a target, the tracking optic then knows what youwant to engage. The optic and trigger collaborate to precisely releaseyour chosen countermeasure. Once the decision has been made to engagethe target sUAS, the tracking system then guides the fire controltrigger to release the countermeasure at the exact moment needed toaffect your target with minimal collateral damage to areas surroundingthe target sUAS. The connection between the tracking optic and the firecontrol trigger contains dozens of microprocessors and electronic,electro-optic, and electro-mechanical components. When the systemengages the fire control triggering mechanism, the image is compared tothe original selected image, again using processes based on data miningtechniques. If the two images are not perfectly aligned with thedesignated or tagged point, the tracking optic interrupts the triggeringsignal and prevents transmission of the tailored RF interdiction signal.At the time when the images are aligned and matched, the interrupt isreleased allowing the transmission of the desired interdictiontransmission. As soon the system intersects the designation point, thefire control trigger is released executing a perfectly aimed deterrentcountermeasure. This automated fire control system virtually eliminateshuman error caused by misaiming, mistiming, system movement, vibrationor other environmental factors.

One example non-limiting technology herein utilizes Radio Frequency (RF)and Direction Finding (DF) technology to detect, and track,identify/classify a commercial sUAS/UAV. The system uses a verysensitive RF receiver scanning the area of interest, in a 360-degreemanner, for any RF signal commonly used as the communication linkbetween the operator and the sUAS. Filters within the signal processoreliminate those signatures that are not found within the population ofthe commercially available sUAS market. Observed signal characteristicsare compared to a library or database of modulation, frequency,pulse-width and duration characteristics to identify known commercialsUAS. When an observed signal matches or is statistically similar to anexpected sUAS RF signature, the azimuth of the suspect sUAS is passed tothe other sensor systems for closer attention. The high gain antenna isalso directed to that azimuth further refining the azimuth and elevationof the suspect sUAS. This system sensor element allows the non-limitingembodiments(s) to operate passively when required.

The example non-limiting technology herein utilizes a deterrent elementto deter, suppress, control or destroy if operated in an applicableenvironment an unmanned system. Additional deterrent values include theability of the systems detect function to locate and track low flyingairborne threats that are not sUAS/UAV in nature. Any future technologywill by matter of physics present a variety of signatures which areobservable by the non-limiting embodiments(s) fused set of sensorphenomenology's, even though they may avoid detection by conventionalair defense systems. In addition, should the FAA (Federal AviationAuthority) mandate future transponder identification processes oncommercial sUAS/UAV; the non-limiting embodiments(s) RF/DF system isdesigned to accept state data generated by non-organic sensors and willincorporate this “told-in” data into the target identification processand algorithms.

As stated above, the example non-limiting technology herein is designedto accept but does not require; subject sUAS location, classification,or other state data generated by non-organic sensors. The integration ofthese components via the herein disclosed mechanism, is a novelcombination of software and hardware, not related to existing art inpurpose, is non-obvious, and provides a useful solution to uninvited,invasive and potentially hazardous commercial sUAS/UAV operationsregarding privacy, security, illegal activity and terrorist threats fromcommercial unmanned aerial vehicles. The individual elements of thenon-limiting embodiments(s) are linked via secure internal controlnetworks and can use existing communications infrastructure or dedicatedhigh bandwidth point-to-point communications hardware to operate theentire system remotely or add additional sensors from remote sources.

The system of the example non-limiting technology herein provides anintegrated multi-sensor system that can be deployed as a “permanentplacement” or as a mobile system on land, sea, or air platform.

The system of the example non-limiting technology herein may bestrategically deployed to monitor the airspace around a protectedinterest such as a property, place, event or very important person (VIP)offering 360-degree azimuth coverage extending from the receivingantennae of the system out to a lateral distance of about 2 kilometers(6560 feet) and within the lateral boundaries up to an altitude of about1.5 kilometers (4920 feet) above ground level (AGL). These distances areaveraged and may increase through the natural progression whenincorporating future technologies and optional embodiments. The areawithin the detection boundaries is considered to be a designatedprotected area. A protected area is identified, outlined and overlaid onthe system mapping display and can be viewed remotely and monitored bythe system operator/HiL.

The deterrent system, 102, transmitted RF frequency power is variablebased on range and observed effect on the subject sUAS control system.The highly focused RF beam minimizes collateral effects on non-targetreceivers.

A multi-sensor system for providing integrated detection, tracking,identify/classification and countermeasures against commercial unmannedaerial vehicles weighing less than 20 kg or 55 pounds may comprise:

-   -   (a) a direction finding high fidelity RF receiver coupled with a        receiving omnidirectional antenna and a receiving directional        antenna for detecting an RF signature of a flying unmanned        aerial vehicle, and a spectral signal identifier processor for        analyzing the RF signature for identifying a set of spectral        signatures of the unmanned aerial vehicle and eliminate        electromagnetic clutter present in the typical UAS RF spectrum;    -   (b) a modified radar system originally intended for detection of        terrestrial (Surface) targets, provided with a radar clutter and        target filter processor for providing input to an azimuth and        elevation vector coordinate data processor for determining the        location of the unmanned aerial vehicle; and    -   (c) a signal generator that produces at least one tailored        signal based on the spectral signatures of the unmanned aerial        vehicle and a variable strength amplifier that generates an        output power, an antenna alignment assembly for adjusting the        alignment of a transmitting directional and focused antenna        based on the location of the unmanned aerial vehicle as        determined by the azimuth and elevation vector coordinate data        processor, the signal generator and amplifier coupled with the        transmitting antenna to send at least one signal to the unmanned        aerial vehicle to alter at least one of the speed, direction and        altitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise: a Multiband LNAAssembly for amplifying received signals from the receivingomnidirectional and receiving directional antennae and transmittingsignals to an Uplink Receive Host Workstation that sends information tothe spectral signal identifier processor where the type of unmannedaerial vehicle is identified using a database of known spectral signalwave information for known unmanned aerial vehicles, and a Frequency andWave Form Parameters unit coupled to a Modulation Look Up Table coupledto an ECM Modulation Type Select unit that is coupled to the signalgenerator that produces at least one tailored signal which is thentransmitted in a highly focused and variable strength beam preciselyaimed at the subject unmanned aerial system.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise a Receive Blankingunit that forces the receiving omnidirectional and a receivingdirectional antenna to stop receiving a radio frequency beingtransmitted by the transmitting directional and focused antennae.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further provide an azimuth andelevation vector coordinate data processor that uses a sphericalcoordinate system for three-dimensional space wherein three numbersspecify the position of a point measured in latitude, longitude andelevation obtained from the radar.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise a laser rangefinder and wherein the azimuth and elevation vector coordinate dataprocessor uses a spherical coordinate system for three-dimensional spacewherein three numbers specify the position of a point measured inlatitude, longitude and elevation obtained from the laser range finderand associated computational algorithms.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise Electro-Opticaland Infrared Sensors and associated computational algorithms andco-located with a Laser Range Finder to provide a comprehensive,multi-purpose targeting system that incorporates a fire-controlcapability and digital display to the system operator/HIL that shows thefield of view of the suspect UAS target(s) along with vital pieces ofdata including range-to-target, target velocity, elevation, azimuth,wind velocity and direction, deterrent zone size, countermeasure type,temperature, barometric pressure and time of day.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may employ at least one tailored signalproduced by the signal generator that is an electronic counter measureeither specifically calculated or selected using modulation lookup tableto determine a broad range of RF signatures used by the flying unmannedaerial vehicle utilizing a database library of specific radiofrequencies characteristics common to unmanned aerial vehicles

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further employ at least onetailored signal produced by the signal generator is an electroniccounter measure either specifically calculated or selected usingmodulation lookup table to determine a broad range of RF signatures usedby the flying unmanned aerial vehicle utilizing a database library ofspecific radio frequencies characteristics common to unmanned aerialvehicles, is augmented by the observed frequencies detected by the RFdetection.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further employ at least onetailored signal produced by the signal generator that is an electroniccounter measure either specifically calculated or selected usingmodulation lookup table to determine a broad range of RF signatures usedby the flying unmanned aerial vehicle utilizing a database library ofspecific radio frequencies characteristics common to unmanned aerialvehicles this tailored signal may vary from the received signal in thata harmonic of the received signal may prove more effective in deterringthe suspect UAV than the actual received signal.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further employ at least onetailored signal produced by the signal generator that is an electroniccounter measure either specifically calculated or selected usingmodulation lookup table to determine a broad range of RF signatures usedby the flying unmanned aerial vehicle utilizing a database library ofspecific radio frequencies characteristics common to unmanned aerialvehicles, use of the frequency harmonic will allow reduced transmitpower and minimize unintended collateral effects.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further employ a transmittingdirectional and focused antenna that is a component of a directionaltransmitting antenna array.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further employ a capability toengage an airborne UAS/UAV in either a destructive (kinetic) or anon-destructive (non-kinetic) manner.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise a means to acceptnon-system generated suspect sUAS identification and locationinformation received from outside sources and to detect and tracktraditional commercial sUAS/UAV containing or not containing electronictransponder identification technology and a means to detect and tracknon-traditional aerial systems (Manned or unmanned) with similarspectral signatures operating in similar low altitude environments.

The system for providing integrated detection and countermeasuresagainst unmanned aerial vehicles may further comprise a secure controlnetwork (using existing infrastructure or dedicated high bandwidthpoint-to-point communications hardware) that allows non-collocatedemplacement of system elements 102 (FIG. 2 ), 103 (FIG. 3 ) and 104 &105 (FIG. 4 ) to provide control of the system from remote locations oradd additional sensors from remote sources.

More Detailed Non-Limiting Example Embodiments

Referring to FIGS. 1A-4 there are shown schematic representations of thecomponents of an integrated detection, tracking,identification/classification and countermeasure system 100 for useagainst small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) 44. In particular, FIG. 1Ashows an example non-limiting embodiment of an overall system 100.

In FIG. 1A, a multiband high gain directional antenna array withvertical polarization transmits multiband high gain RF signals. MatrixDirectional Transmit Antenna Array—designated as 10 in FIGS. 1A and 2 ,is a signal processing technique used in sensor (Antenna) arrays fordirectional signal transmission; this is achieved by combining elementsin a phased array in such a way that signals at particular anglesexperience constructive interference while others experience destructiveinterference; this equipment can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” and onecommon manufacturer of this type of equipment is Motorola. DirectionalAntenna—designated as 10 in FIGS. 1A and 2, and 12 in FIGS. 1A and 3 ,may comprise in one non-limiting embodiment a class of directional orbeam antenna that radiates greater power in one or more directionsallowing for increased performance on transmits and receives and reducedinterference from unwanted sources. These transmitted RF signals arespecifically generated to interrupt or “spoof” the UAS/UAV on-boardreceivers or any other destructive/non-destructive deterrent.

A receive omnidirectional antenna array 12 is used to refine the inboundazimuth of the suspect sUAS 44 and can produce an X, Y coordinate whenthe RF signal is detected by more than one RF receiver being utilizedwith the system. Receive Directional Antenna Array—designated as 12 inFIGS. 1A and 3 , refers to multiple receiving antennae arranged suchthat the superposition of the electromagnetic waves is a predictableelectromagnetic field and that the currents running through them are ofdifferent amplitudes and phases; this equipment can be purchased“Off-The-Shelf” and one common manufacturer of this type of equipment isMotorola and WiNRADIO.

A receive omnidirectional antenna array 14 provides 360° alerting andcueing data which allows the directional antenna 12 to be preciselyaimed at the suspect sUAS 44. Omni-directional Antenna—designated as 14in FIGS. 1A and 3 , may comprise a class of antenna which receives ortransmits radio wave power uniformly in all directions in one plane,with the radiated power decreasing with elevation angle above or belowthe plane, dropping to zero on the antenna's axis. Receive Omni AntennaArray—designated as 14 in FIGS. 1A and 3 , may comprise a class ofantenna that receives radio wave power uniformly in all directions inone plane; this equipment can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” and onecommon manufacturer of this type of equipment is Motorola.

EO/IR sensor 16 (electro-optical and/or infrared) may be collocated withLRF (laser range finder) with target acquisition and fire controlsystem. Electro-Optical and Infrared Sensors—designated as 16 in FIGS.1A and 4 , is a combination of a standard high definition video cameracapable of viewing in daylight conditions and an infrared video cameracapable of viewing in the infrared light perspective; both camerasystems can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” as common technology, onecommon manufacturer of this type of camera systems is FLIR Systems.IR—infrared is invisible (to the human eye) radiant energy,electromagnetic radiation with longer wavelengths than those of visiblelight, extending from the nominal red edge of the visible spectrum at700 nanometers (frequency 430 THz) to 1 mm (300 GHz). Laser RangeFinder—designated as 16 in FIGS. 1A and 4 , is a rangefinder which usesa laser beam, usually pulsed, to determine vital pieces of dataincluding range-to-target, target velocity, deterrent angle, compassheading, wind velocity and direction, deterrent zone size,countermeasure type, temperature, barometric pressure and time of day.This equipment can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” and one commonmanufacturer of this type of equipment is TrackingPoint. This LRF-sensorarrangement 16 provides images for recognition of a suspect sUAS 44. LRFsensor arrangement 16 may also provide an X, Y, Z coordinate for thetarget 44 that is detected.

An automatic antenna alignment assembly 18 provides precision antennaalignment based on the X, Y, Z data produced by a radar system 43 andLRF system 16, for both the interdiction and directional antennas.Automatic Antenna Alignment Assembly—designated as 18 in FIGS. 1A, 2 and3 , and as 22 in FIGS. 1A and 4 , is specialized electronic equipmentspecifically designed to automatically point the directional antennaeand or camera, laser systems to the desired location, namely a smallunmanned aerial vehicles/systems (sUAS) designated as a target 44 inFIG. 1A, based on longitude and or latitude information gained orreceived by the receiving antennae, designated as 12 and 14 in FIGS. 1Aand 3 , and or radar antennae designated as 43 in FIGS. 1A and 4 ; thisspecialized equipment can be purchased from and is proprietary toenrGies Engineering located in Huntsville, Alabama.

A multiband LNA (low noise amplifier) assembly 20 amplifies the lowpower waveform received by antennas 12, 14 for use by other processingfunctions. Multiband Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) Assembly—designated as 20in FIGS. 1A and 3 , is a multi-radio frequency electronic amplifier usedto amplify possibly very weak signals, for example captured by anantenna.

An automatic antenna alignment assembly 22 similarly provides precisionantenna alignment based on the X, Y, Z data produced by the radar system43 for the LRF subsystem and the EO/IR sensor 16.

High fidelity RF receivers are coupled to a host workstation CPU 24. CPU24 executes control signal processing algorithms based on softwareinstructions stored in non-transitory memory. Uplink/Video StandardDefinition (SD) Receiver & Host Workstation—designated as 24 in FIGS. 1Aand 3 , is a connection from the antennae to the video encoder where theinformation is processed by the main computer network; the uplinkequipment can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” and one common manufacturerof this type of equipment is Cisco Systems; the video receiver and maincomputer is also “Off-The-Shelf” technology and are readily availablefrom numerous manufacturers.

An azimuth and elevation vector coordinate data processor 26 is used tocalculate azimuth and elevation of target 44. Azimuth and ElevationVector Coordinate Data—designated as 26 in FIGS. 1A and 4 , isspecialized algorithm software that has been developed to be used with aspherical coordinate system for three-dimensional space where threenumbers specify the position of a point measured in latitude, longitudeand elevation obtained from the LRF & EO/IR Sensors designated as 16 inFIGS. 1A and 4 that includes a Laser Range Finder, and/or Radardesignated as 43 in FIGS. 1A and 4 .

Uplink Video/Radio Transmitter Assembly—designated as 28 in FIGS. 1A and2 , is a device that will take the received radio or video frequencyinformation from database libraries designated as 36 in FIGS. 1 and 3,40 in FIGS. 1A-3, and 42 in FIGS. 1A and 3 and send it through a radioamplifier designated as 34 in FIGS. 1A-3 to a transmitting directionalantenna or matrix directional transmit antenna array designated as 10 inFIGS. 1A and 2 ; this equipment can be purchased “Off-The-Shelf” and onecommon manufacturer of this type of equipment is Motorola.

An Empower 1189-BVM3 wideband HPA assembly with a receive blanking unit30 is provided. Blanking—designated as 30 in FIGS. 1A, 2 and 3 is thetime between the last radio transmitting signal and the beginning of thenext radio transmitting signal. Receive Blanking—designated as 30 inFIG. 1A-3 , is specialized algorithm software that has been developed tostop the receiving antennae, designated as 12 and 14 in FIGS. 1A and 3 ,from receiving radio frequency signals during the time that the countermeasure transmitting frequency, designated as 34 in FIGS. 1A-3 , isbeing transmitted by directional transmitting antennae, designated as 10in FIGS. 1A and 2 , for the purpose of deterrence or interdiction of thesuspect unmanned aerial vehicle/system, designated as a target 44 inFIG. 1A, identified as a known threat.

A sensor fusion processor 32 includes a direction detect and rangeestimator that estimates direction and range of target 44 based uponinputs received from the radar 43 and the LRF 16. Direction Detectionand Range Estimation—designated as 32 in FIGS. 1A-4 , is specializedalgorithm software that has been developed to detect a suspected targetor signal of interest and calculated to obtain the azimuth and distanceto that target or signal of interest based on data obtained by the RadioFrequency (RF) detection section 103 in FIG. 3 , the Radar detectionsection 104 in FIG. 4 , and the Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) (16)and co-located LRF (Laser Range Finder) (16) detection section 105 inFIG. 4 . DF—designated as 12 in FIGS. 1A and 3 , Direction Findingrefers to the measurement of the direction from which a received signalwas transmitted; this can refer to radio or other forms of wirelesscommunication. Sensor Fusion Processor—Designated as number 32 in FIGS.1A, 2, 3, and 4 is a control system processor which integrates thediscrete data from all inputting sensors—This set of algorithms andprocesses provides the Human in the Loop (HiL) a visual display ofsubject location and type classification, as well as EO/IR imagery;overlaid on a moving map display; and includes the interdict commandlogic. These control functions are available via a service on our systemsecure internal network.

A Keysight N931 CA RF signal generator with multiple modulation sourcesis coupled to an ECM modulation type selector 38. Electronic CounterMeasure (ECM) Modulation Type Select—designated as 38 in FIGS. 1A-3 isspecialized algorithm software that has been developed to help narrowdown the radio frequency identified by a modulation lookup table of thespecific unmanned aerial vehicle/system of interest, designated as atarget 44 in FIG. 1A, utilizing a database library that was created andcategorized with the specific radio frequencies common to all unmannedaerial vehicles/systems. A Spectral Signal Detect and Type Identifier 36contains an RF library in databases of current, previously stored andnew wave forms and frequencies of sUAS 44. Spectral Signal—designated as36 in FIGS. 1A and 3 , the frequency spectrum of a time-domain signal isa representation of that signal in the frequency domain. Spectral SignalDetection and Type Identification—designated as 36 in FIGS. 1A and 3 ,is specialized algorithm software that has been developed to detect andidentify unmanned aerial vehicles/systems utilizing a database librarythat was created and categorized with the spectral signatures common toall unmanned aerial vehicles/systems.

A frequency and waveform parameter generator 40 is used to specifyfrequency and waveform parameters for transmission. Frequency andWaveform Parameters—designated as 40 in FIGS. 1A-3 , Is specializedalgorithm software that has been developed to identify unmanned aerialvehicles/systems utilizing a database library that was created andcategorized with the specific radio frequency waveform common to allunmanned aerial vehicles/systems.

FIG. 2 shows a countermeasure and deterrent section couple to themultiband high gain directional antenna array 10. In this example, anautomatic antenna alignment assembly 18 may be mechanically and/orelectrically coupled to the antenna array 10 to set and change theazimuth and elevation of the antenna. As shown in FIG. 2 , the automaticantenna alignment assembly 18 may include various components including apan/tilt unit (PTU) 18 a, a magnetic compass 18 b, a position locationmodem 18 c, and a power and signal processor 18 d. The automatic antennaalignment assembly 18 is controlled by the sensor fusionprocessor/identification subsystem 32 including a detection and rangeestimation processor. The detection range estimation processor usesreceived sensor signals to identify potential targets 44, and thencontrols the automatic antenna alignment assembly 18 to move and/orreconfigure the multiband high gain directional antenna array in orderto beam transmission signals at the target. A multiband antenna array 10receives signals to transmit from the Empower 1189-BVM3 wideband HPAassembly, which is coupled to a system power and system monitor 99. TheEmpower unit 28 interacts with a Keysight N93110A RF signal generatorwith multiple modulation sources 34, thereby generating particularsignals with particular modulation superimposed thereon for transmissionby antenna array 10.

ECM modulation configuration data and receive blanking signal unit 30interacts with the Keysight unit 34. Modulation FunctionGeneration—designated as 34 in FIGS. 1A-3 , Is specialized algorithmsoftware that has been developed to transmit (Jam) a specific radiofrequency, designated by 38 in FIGS. 1A-3 and 42 in FIGS. 1A and 3 ,which is unique to a specific unmanned aerial vehicles/systems utilizinga database library that was created and categorized with the specificradio frequencies used on all common unmanned aerial vehicles/systems.The ECM modulation configuration data unit 38 in turn receives inputsignals from the identification subsystems 30, 40. Modulation LookupTable—designated as 42 in FIGS. 1A and 3 , is specialized algorithmsoftware that has been developed to identify the broad range of radiofrequencies being used by a specific unmanned aerial vehicle/system ofinterest, designated as a target 44 in FIG. 1A, utilizing a databaselibrary that was created and categorized with the specific radiofrequencies common to all unmanned aerial vehicles/systems.Identification subsystem 30 uses receive blanking control, whereas theidentification subsystem 40 uses frequency waveform algorithms.

FIG. 3 shows the example non-limiting radio frequency detection section103. In this example, the received directional antenna array 12 providesits received signal output to a WD-3300 direction finding system 20. TheRF receiving omnidirectional antenna 14 provides its received signals toan MS-811A wideband multichannel monitoring system 20′. These receiversprovide modulated signals to the uplink/video SD receivers/host workstation/CPU 24 that executes direction detect and range estimationalgorithms under software instruction control stored in non-transitorymemory (sometimes with humans in the loop). The CPU 24 operates inconjunction with ECM modulation type and data selection 38 and frequencyand waveform parameter selection algorithm 40. A spectral signaldetected type identification modulation data algorithm 36 and receiveblanking control 30 also operates in conjunction with CPU 24. Receiveblanking control 30 provides its receive blanking output to theinterdictions subsystem 34. The ECM modulation type and data selection38 similarly provides its output to an interdiction subsystem 42 basedupon ECM modulation and configuration data. The CPU 34 provides anoutput to an interdiction subsystem A4 system with steering data 18, andreceives inputs from the detection subsystem sensor azimuth andelevation data 46.

FIG. 4 shows an example non-limiting radar detection section 104 andEO/IR/LRF detection section 105. In this example, the radar detectionsection 104 includes, for example, an X-band radar such as a Vista SmartSensor SSSR 43. The power output of the X-band radar transceiver will beselected for desired range. The Vista smart sensor radar processor SSSR33′ coupled to the radar detection section 43 may provide azimuth andelevation vector coordinate data to unit 26. Target clutter and filteralgorithms 45 may be used and/or executed by the Vista smart sensorradar processor SSSR 43′. The EO/IR/LRF detection section 16 may provideits output as explained above to an automatic antenna alignment assembly22. The automatic antenna alignment assembly 22 may be informed by theazimuth and elevation vector coordinate data 26. The azimuth andelevation vector coordinate data 26 may operate in cooperation with adetect direction and range estimation process the sensor fusionprocessor 32 implements. STC—Slew To Cue, the autonomous actions ofelectronic, radio or optical sensors to rotate using an automaticantenna alignment assembly designated as 18 in FIGS. 1A-3, and 22 inFIGS. 1A and 4 to move and point cameras 16 in FIGS. 1A and 4 andcountermeasures 10 in FIGS. 1A and 2 in the direction of a suspecttarget 44 in FIG. 1A, based on input from data processed by components26 in FIGS. 1A and 4, and 46 in FIGS. 1A, 3 and 4 , thus, keeping the“cued” targets in view at all times with or without human intervention.

FIG. 5 shows an example non-limiting flow chart that describes operationof the embodiment shown in FIGS. 1A-4 . Upon initial RF detection of atarget 44 (block 510), and/or initial radar detection block 510 a, thesystem may process these signals to identify a preliminary position (X,Y, Z) of the target (block 510 b). The optical/IR/laser range finder maybe used to derive a more precise X, Y, Z location, and imagery is fed tothe sensor fusion processor (block 520). The system may then refine theX, Y, and Z coordinate position of the target and analyze receivedsignatures and then begin tracking the target (block 520 a). The systemmay next select a deterrent mode form and frequency for use ininterdiction (block 520 a). The system may then use sensor data fusionto yield a target ID/classification with or without a human in the loop(block 530). HiL—Designated as part of sensor fusion processor 32 inFIGS. 1A, 2, 3 and 4 is the system control position allowing the systemoperator or also referred to as the Human in the Loop (HiL) the abilityto monitor all system functions/displays and has the opportunity tooverride the automated functions of the system. The computers and/or ahuman in the loop may observe the EO/IR imagery and make deter/non-deterdecision (block 530). If the decision is to deter, then interdiction isinitiated (block 540). Such interdiction may result from the applicationof a highly tailored narrow beam RF pulse which is generated, amplifiedand transmitted along the azimuth and elevation determined in thetracking processes with power based on the range to the target (block540).

FIG. 5 thus represents a simplified visual over-view of the systemprocesses that occur, from start to finish, in detecting (510), tracking(520), identification/classification (530) and deterring (540) a sUAS(44).

-   -   1. A first function of the system is detecting a suspect sUAS        target as reflected in sections 103-105 and 510 of FIG. 3-5 .    -   2. The second function of the system is tracking a suspect sUAS        target as reflected in sections 103-105 and 520 of FIG. 3-5 .    -   3. The third function of the system is identifying a suspect        sUAS target as reflected by sections 103-105 and 530 of FIG. 3-5        .    -   4. The fourth function of the system is a deterrent targeting a        suspect sUAS as reflected by section 102 and 540 of FIG. 3-5 .        This element of the system may be augmented with a destructive        element consisting of a kinetic weapon system but is currently        illustrated in FIG. 1A using a non-kinetic RF deterrent.

In more detail, the first function of the system is to detect the Radarand RF signatures of a suspect sUAS flying near or within the system'sdetection boundaries. All sUAS's have a distinct set of spectralsignatures (sound, heat, radar cross section, radio frequency wavepattern) detected by a spectral signal identifier processor 36. Thisfact is the basis for the detection sections 103-105 of the system 100of the non-limiting embodiments(s). Section 510 of FIG. 5 , Section 104of FIG. 4 and Section 103 of FIG. 3 of the example non-limitingtechnology herein are used for the detection process. This processbegins with the radar 43 and/or the Receive Omni Antenna Array 14detecting the presence of an airborne sUAS 44 within the defined area ofprotection. Any suspect sUAS 44 detected by the radar 43 producesradar-generated signature that is compared with known radar signatures,stored within the radar library database 43, of common sUAS systems toverify that the suspect target is a sUAS. The system of the non-limitingembodiments(s) will use a proven high-end direction finding (DF)equipment 12, 14 and a high fidelity RF receiver 24 coupled withomnidirectional and directional antennae 12 and 14 to detect thecommunication link between a sUAS 44 and its operator. When the DFequipment 12, 14 has detected a communication link of a sUAS within thesystem boundaries, the receive host workstation 24 will analyze theradio frequency wave signature and confirm that the RF detected is froma sUAS.

This identification process also applies when a radar unit 43 isintegrated with the DF equipment. This element of the system may beaugmented with additional signature detection elements consisting ofacoustic sensors but is currently illustrated in FIG. 1A using theprimary radar sensors 43, RF sensors 12, 14 and electro optical sensor16. In addition, the RF receiver 20 scans for the presence of known C2uplink or downlink and video uplink or downlink frequencies commonlyused by sUAS and compare the received signature against known RFsignatures stored within a library database 36. Successful matchesgenerate a target file and release the X, Y, and Z coordinate data 26and 46 of that target to the A4 units 18 & 22 to begin the process oftracking. Integrating multiple Direction Finding (DF) equipment 12, 14to the system of the non-limiting embodiments(s) will increase theprecision in obtaining the azimuth that the sUAS is flying. Integratingradar equipment 43 provided with a radar clutter and target filterprocessor 45, with the direction finding (DF) equipment and LRF 16 willprovide the non-limiting embodiments(s) the ability to determine withgreater accuracy the altitude and azimuth of the sUAS 44 at the time ofdiscovery and during the time it remains within the systems detectionboundaries.

The coordinate data obtained from DF 26, 46, radar unit 43 and LRF 16,is then sent to the direction detect and range estimation, (SensorFusion Processor) 32, where algorithms will be used to send sUASlocation coordinates to the Automatic Antenna Alignment Assembly (A4)22, 18. Put another way, using an enhanced analytic function commonlyreferred to as “Slew-To-Cue”, the non-limiting embodiments(s) causesautonomously, the actions of the electronic, radio frequency sensorsand/or optical sensors to rotate using the automatic antenna alignmentassembly 18, 22 to move and point cameras and collocated LRF 16 withcountermeasures antenna 10, in the direction of a suspect sUAS 44 basedon input from data processed by the azimuth and elevation unit 26, 46,thus, keeping the “cued” targets in view at all times with or withouthuman intervention. This information will then direct the AutomaticAntenna Alignment Assembly (A4) 22 to point the Electro-Optical andLaser Range Finding unit 16 at the sUAS. This precise aiming functionenables highly accurate visual and non-visual imagery to be captured ofthe suspect sUAS, 44. By comparison of the captured imagery againstknown and continuously improving profile databases maintained oraccessed by sensor fusion processor 32, sophisticated pixel andhistogram comparison algorithms will confirm or deny that the targetbeing viewed is a sUAS and a threat assessment is then generated.

The detect elements operate with unique software translating discernablesignatures (Radar, RF, EO/IR) into identifiable data aiding in thedetection and identification/classification process. All signature data(Radar, RF & EO/IR) is then processed and coupled with the LRF 16 datato generate a reference azimuth and elevation 26, 46 of the suspect sUAS44. The information generated by the systems detection section is thenpassed electronically to the direction and range estimation processor,(Sensor Fusion Processor) 32, to yield a sUAS location and overlaid onthe system mapping display to be viewed by the system operator/HiL. TheRF detection receiver and processors 24 determine the: radio (carrier)frequency, pulse width or pulse duration, pulse repetition interval,signal amplitude and polarization; to a lesser extent the scan patternand rate. These characteristics are then compared within the librarydatabase 36 to the known characteristics of the most likely sUAS RFelement profiles. This analytic function is performed in an automatedprocess resident in system detect element 103.

The example non-limiting technology herein is intended to utilize all ofthe multi-sensors described above to obtain X, Y and Z (Longitude,Latitude and Altitude) of the suspect sUAS. Each sensor may be usedindependently or collectively. The Radar in FIG. 2 can be use instand-alone mode to provide the X, Y, Z coordinates to Azimuth andElevation Vector Coordinate Data Processor 46 and Directional Detect andRange Estimation function of sensor fusion processor 32 that enables theslew to clue (STC) to the EO/IR/LRF 16 and Receive Directional Antenna12 and or Deterrent system Antennae 10. The RF receive antenna 12 andOmni-directional antenna 14 in FIG. 3 can also provide the X and Ycoordinates in stand-alone mode to activate the Automatic AntennaAlignment Assembly 18 & 22, the Multiband High gain Directional AntennaArray 10 and EO/IR/Laser Range Finder 16 as displayed in FIGS. 1A and 2. This automated function points the directional antennae 10 and orEO/IR and Laser Range Finder 16 to the desired location based onlongitude and or latitude information gained or received by thereceiving antennae, designated as 12 and 14 in FIGS. 1A and 3 , and orradar antennae designated as 43 in FIGS. 1A and 4 . Additionally,non-system generated suspect sUAS identification and locationinformation received from outside sources may be used in the calculationprocesses within the system of example non-limiting technology herein.

The example non-limiting technology herein begins calculation of theoptimized waveform and necessary power and frequency to interfere withthe suspect sUAS on-board electronic controls and communication links.Simultaneously, the threat assessment and sUAS identity information ismade available via visual display to the system operator/HiL providingan opportunity to override the interdiction sequence of the non-limitingembodiments(s) if desired.

A second function of the system, 520 of FIG. 5 , is to track a suspectsUAS that is within the system boundaries or approaching a protectedarea. When a suspect sUAS nears or enters the system boundaries,azimuthal data obtained by the detection sections 103, 104 and 105 issent to the automatic antenna alignment assembly 22 and 18. Section 104&105 of FIG. 4 and Items 12, 14, 16, 20 & 32 of FIG. 3 of thenon-limiting embodiments(s) are used for the tracking process.Coordinate data obtained by the radar 43, Omni and Directional antennas12, 14 and the LRF 16 are sent to the Sensor Fusion Processor 32 where aset of algorithms and processes provides the System Operator/HiL avisual display of continuous suspect sUAS 44 location as well as theEO/IR imagery and threat assessment, overlaid on a moving map displayand includes the interdict command logic needed in Step 4. The radar 43will provides X, Y, Z location data and preliminary suspect sUASidentification based on the observed radar signature (cross-section,Doppler effect, polarization). The observed sUAS characteristics arecompared in a signature library or database 43 of known sUAS of concern.This database is updated with observed characteristics and becomes morerefined with use. These computational functions take place within 43 andare continuously refined as the suspect sUAS 44 is tracked. The system'scontrol software/hardware provides this information to the integratedElectro-Optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) sensor 16, which autonomouslycenters the field of regard of the EO/IR sensor to the known location ofthe suspect sUAS 44.

The LRF 16, assisted by the system of software/hardware, will thendetermine the precise X, Y, Z coordinates (X=longitude, Y=latitude,Z=altitude) of the suspect sUAS. The azimuth, elevation and distance isobtained by the Laser Range Finder 16, and is transferred to the Azimuthand Elevation Vector Coordinate Data processor unit 26 that calculatesthe precise azimuth and elevation information and uses that to generateservo commands which drive the A4 system 18 controlling the MatrixDirectional Transmit Antenna Array 10 via the Direction Detect and RangeEstimation function of sensor fusion processor 32; to aim the associatedequipment at the suspect sUAS 44. This precise location and rangeinformation is provided to the countermeasure and deterrent section 102of the system 100. Using this data, the countermeasure and deterrentsection 102 computes the RF spectral characteristics that will nullifycontrol signals that the suspect sUAS expects to receive. A signalgenerator 34 produces a tailored signal and a variable strengthamplifier 28 generates the output power required to cause the desiredeffect at the desired range to the targeted sUAS 44 as indicated withinthe fourth function of the system.

A third function of the system, 530 of FIG. 5 , is to identify the sUASthat is approaching or within the system boundaries or protected area.Item 36 of FIG. 3 , Item 43 of FIG. 4 and Item 32 of FIGS. 1A, 2, 3 and4 of the non-limiting embodiments(s) is the identification process. Thisprocess utilizes radar data obtained by Radar 43, the RF data 36gathered by the Receive Omni & Directional Antenna Array 14 & 12combined with the visual and or heat signatures generated from the EO/IRcamera system 16 to determine the type of sUAS and any payload the sUASmay have attached to it. This data is sent to the Sensor FusionProcessor 32 that integrates the discrete data from all inputtingsensors listed above to aid in target identification and threatassessment. Further, a set of algorithms and processes continues toprovide the System Operator/HiL a visual display of geo-referencedsuspect sUAS 44 locations and type classification, as well as EO/IRimagery overlaid on a moving map display. These functions are describedin a linear manner but are continuously updated, thereby increasing thepositional and sUAS identification/threat assessment accuracy.

As this data is collected and refined, the interdiction RF waveformamplitude, pulse width and repetition frequency is also refined. Theinterdiction RF frequency is determined and will be a harmonic of thedetected RF frequency controlling the suspect sUAS, thereby, increasingits effects on the sUAS control sensors and minimizing potential forunintended collateral effect. The system uses the hardware and softwareof the Radio Frequency (RF) detection section 103 and the associatedknown and observed communication radio frequencies signatures exhibitedbetween the sUAS and its controlling operator, to include video dataexchange, and compares it against the stored data (RF Database 42) ofknown sUAS control/video frequencies. The system also analyzes anddetermines the RF spectral characteristics needed to nullify thecommunication control signals of the suspect sUAS 44.

During the identification process, the system will also conduct anautomated threat assessment to determine if the suspect sUAS is carryinga payload of concern (size and shape) by comparing video/photo analyticsand radar signatures, to include visual inspection/verification by thesystem operator, and evaluate other concerning data, such as detectionof an encrypted video downlink, flight profile or course, to generate acontinuous threat assessment. By comparing known non-threatening sUASanalytic profiles with known threatening sUAS profiles, the system datamining processes can classify a targeted sUAS with an initial threatlevel or advance to a higher threat level if additional concerning datais received or observed. The system continuously monitors the locationand threat assessment information of the targeted sUAS allowing thesystem operator live information prior to deterring the sUAS with anon-kinetic interdiction response or destroy the sUAS if the system isarmed with a kinetic countermeasure device.

The fourth function of the system, 540 of FIG. 5 , is to deter/interdictthe operation of a targeted sUAS that has entered into the systemboundaries or protected area. Section 102 of FIG. 2 and Item 32 of FIGS.1A, 2, 3 and 4 of the non-limiting embodiments(s) is the deterrenceprocess. This process can use either a non-destructive method to forcethe sUAS to land or return to its departure location or a destructivemethod in stopping/destroying a sUAS threat. FIG. 5 , section 540,represents a non-destructive method utilizing a Multi Band High GainDirectional antenna array 10 using vertical polarization to transmit RFsignals directly at the targeted sUAS 44. These RF waveforms are thenused to disrupt the expected inputs to the onboard controller of thetargeted sUAS 44. However, depending on the operational environment; anon-destructive system may be augmented or coupled with a destructivesystem consisting of a kinetic weapon system.

The system's non-destructive deterrence against a targeted sUAS isachieved by transmitting the most advantageous RF frequency derivedbased on the identification information obtained from RF frequencydatabase 42 and RF spectral analysis 36 derived in Step 2 and 3. Thisconcentrated Radio Frequency (RF) emission tuned to the specific sUAScharacteristics identified by the spectral analysis during the detectionprocess is obtained when the communications link, or any other RFemission generated by subject sUAS is detected by the Radio Frequency(RF) detection section 103 of the system. Information is passed throughthe Multiband LNA Assembly 20 and through the Uplink Receive HostWorkstation 24. The information is then sent to the Spectral SignalDetect and Type Identification unit 36 where the type of sUAS isdetermined based on a known sUAS RF profile database containing SpectralSignal Wave information 36. When the Spectral Signal Waveforminformation is known the information is sent to the Frequency and WaveForm Parameters unit 40 where the analyzed RF data is sent to theModulation Look Up Table 42. When the Modulation characterization ismade, that data is transferred to the ECM Modulation Type Selectprocessor 38 where the non-limiting embodiments(s) creates a uniquelytailored waveform. The selected modulation waveform is then sent to theUplink Video Transmitter Assembly 28. That unit works in conjunctionwith the Receive Blanking unit 30. When the Uplink Video Transmitter 28is transmitting a radio signal the Receive Blanking unit 30 will forcethe DF antennae 12, 14 to stop receiving the radio frequency beingtransmitted by the Matrix Directional Transmit Antenna Array 10. Theradio frequency selected to disrupt the communication link between thetargeted sUAS 44 and its' operator is then transmitted by theTransmitter Assembly 28 using the Matrix Directional Transmit AntennaArray 10 aimed at the sUAS 44 via the Automatic Antenna AlignmentAssembly 18. The countermeasure and deterrent section 102 broadcaststhis unique generated RF waveform using highly directional and focusedantennae 10. The system uses Blanking 30 at the time between the lastradio transmitting signal and the beginning of the nextradio-transmitting signal of the transmitted signal in accordance withthe frequency and waveform parameters 40 to avoid negative internaleffects to system 103.

The countermeasure and deterrent section 102 of the system 100interdicts the operation of a targeted sUAS in a non-destructive mannerby using the non-destructive technology described above to generate aninterdict transmission signal that is significantly higher gain(Stronger Signal) than the control signals produced from an operatorcontrol unit transmitting to the targeted sUAS 44. The video downlinkfrequency is the initial target of the interdiction process. If thisinterruption is not sufficient to deter the targeted sUAS 44, the RFtransmitter will be tuned to the appropriate control frequency todisrupt the targeted sUAS 44 on-board electronics increasing theprobability of the targeted sUAS 44 entering into its “Fail Safe Mode”.This action is sUAS specific and is based on the manufacturer design andsUAS operational capabilities. The interdict transmission will targetboth the sensor and the control electronics of the sUAS. The effects ofthe higher gain radio transmission will cause amongst other effects,servo-chatter and disruption of most on-board electronic processesresulting in the loss of control of the targeted sUAS 44 or forcing itto land or return back to its departure location (Fail Safe Mode).

The non-limiting embodiments(s) considers the differences based on themanufacturer design and operational capabilities of the sUAS on acase-by-case basis and tailors the systems countermeasure/deterrentresponse accordingly. The interdiction process may be augmented withelectro-magnetic pulse technology, pulsed laser and is specificallydesigned to accept other current or future counter-measures used todefeat the sUAS' electronics, motors and or navigation systems. Inaddition, a separate, system operated, sUAS can be dispatched withautonomous navigation data being supplied by the system of non-limitingembodiments(s) to locate and intentionally disable the opposing sUAS byflying into it, dropping a net on the threat, covering it with sprayfoam or liquid or capturing the opposing sUAS.

Example Non-Limiting Threat Assessment Process

FIG. 6 shows an example non-limiting sensor fusion and threat assessmentprocess performed by sensor fusion processor 32. In the examplenon-limiting embodiment, sensor fusion processor 32 receives andprocesses the inputs of many different sensors, i.e., radar 43, radiofrequency receiving antennas 12 and 14 (including the azimuth/elevationcoordinates of receive directional antenna array 12, optical/infraredsensor and laser range finder 16 (including associated azimuth andelevation information). Processing is performed based on video-photoanalytics 32B, direction, detection and range estimation 32C, and afusion process 32D.

From the radar 43, sensor fusion processor 32 receives informationindicative of detected target presence, detected target size, detectedtarget range, number of detected targets and three-dimensional (XYZ)position of each detected target. Radar 43 also provides informationconcerning detected target speed and direction. In some embodiments, theradar 43 provides such information in the form of a display image thatsensor fusion processor 32 analyzes to extract useful information. Inother embodiments, radar 43 may provide data packets encoding suchinformation periodically, on demand or otherwise.

From directional RF antenna 12, sensor fusion processor 32 receivesinformation indicative of azimuth and elevation (direction in 2dimensions) of a transmitting entity, signal strength of receivedtransmissions, frequencies on which the transmissions are occurring(such information can be derived using a spectrum analyzer for example)and in some cases the content of transmission including identifiers andthe like.

From omnidirectional RF antenna 12, sensor fusion processor 32 receivessignal strength of received transmissions, frequencies on which thetransmissions are occurring (such information can be derived using aspectrum analyzer for example) and in some cases the content oftransmission including identifiers and the like. The omnidirectionalantenna 14 functions even when the directional antenna 14 is not (yet)aimed at the target.

From EO/IR/LRF 16, sensor fusion processor 32 receives target rangeinformation, target direction information (three-dimensional positionXYZ coordinates in the best case) as well as target movement and speedof movement information. In some embodiments, the sensor fusionprocessor 32 also receives images (IR, visible light or both) of thetarget that can help with target identification.

As can be seen in FIG. 6 , the sensor fusion processor 32 uses differentcombinations of these sensor inputs to determine differentcharacteristics concerning the target. For example, sensor fusionprocessor 32 can detect target location based on the RF relatedinformation, the radar information, the imagery information and thelaser range finder information. The sensor fusion processor 32 mayattempt to classify the target based on RF information, radarinformation and imagery. The sensor fusion processor 32 may determine abearing/heading for the target and the speed of the target along thatbearing/heading based on the radar and LRF information. The sensorfusion processor 32 may determine the size/shape of the target andpresence of a payload on the target based on radar and imagery. Thesensor fusion processor 32 may determine a flight profile for the targetbased on radar, imagery and LRF.

The sensor fusion processor 32 in the example non-limiting embodiment isable to process different inputs with different algorithm and thencorrelate or filter results to obtain a more accurate value than wouldbe possible using single sensor inputs. For example, radar 43 and laserrange finder 16 each provide target range information, but differentconditions and factors such as weather, nature of the target, ambientlighting, interference and other factors can affect these twoindependent sensing mechanisms differently. The LRF 16 for example maybe more accurate at closer ranges in lower light conditions, whereas theradar 43 may be more accurate at further ranges when there is noprecipitation. Sensor fusion processor 32 takes such differences insensor performance into account when weighting and filtering thedifferent inputs in order to optimize accuracy and reliability.

Based on this multi-sensor analysis and data mining process via allavailable data inputs, the sensor fusion processor 32 creates a threatvalue (ThV) for each criterion and in particular uses a rankingmethodology applied to the established logic of multi-criteria analysisto create a threat value (ThV) for each criteria which include;Location, Target Classification, Bearing, Speed, Payload, Size, andFlight Profile. The threat assessment (ThA) of a function (fx) of thesevalues. The ThA is compared to a variable set of rules and results in asystem generated interdict/monitor command. The ThA is outputted to aninterdiction system (102) and displayed for a human in the loop (HIL).Part of the function of sensor fusion processor 32 is to develop aconfidence factor that is used to determine whether to interdict andwhat type of interdiction to command. For example, potentiallydestructive interdiction is not commanded unless the confidence value ishigh.

Threat Assessment (ThA) in one non-limiting embodiment is the level ofthreat assigned a specific target after application of the analyticprocesses as well as potential data from external sources, data mining,as well as consideration of the ThV. ThA is based on the sum of ThV ofeach criteria which is derived from data provided by the systems inputsensors: radar, RF detection, EO/IR imagery, and range. Each sensor thatis currently functioning contributes to the algorithm based on thatsensor's observed phenomenology. Fault tolerance is provided bycontinuing to operate with all available information even when one ormore sensors is damaged, has failed or is otherwise not providing usefulinformation.

Rule sets, which may be varied, specify the required interdiction actiontaken for a given ThA, e.g., ThA of 10 results in an immediate fullpower interdiction transmission, continuing until the target isneutralized; ThA of 1 generates a monitor only response.

As example:

Contributing ThV Sensor Criteria Criteria ThV Weight (weighted) RF,Radar, Imagery, LRF Location 3 1 3 RF, Radar, Imagery Classification 5 15 Radar, LRF Bearing −1 2 −2 Radar, LRF Speed 1 2 2 Radar, ImageryPayload 5 2 10 Radar, Imagery Size 3 1 3 Radar, Imagery, LRF FlightProfile 3 1 3 Threat Assessment (ThA) 24

In this example, the ThA of 24 would result in immediate interdiction;the presence of an observable threatening payload. Such a ThA makes it avery high priority target. This assessment is an iterative process untilthe target either leaves the area of concern or is interdicted.

Glossary

-   -   Algorithm—a process or set of rules to be followed in        calculations or other problem-solving operations by a computer    -   C2 Communications—Command and Control Communications links    -   Commercial—relating to or engaged in commerce (i.e.,        NON-military)    -   Counter—to offer in response or act in opposition    -   CUASs2—Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems of Systems, the system of        the non-limiting embodiments(s) used to detect,        identify/classify, track and deter or interdict small unmanned        aerial vehicles or systems    -   Emitter—to send or give out a matter of energy    -   EO—Electro-Optics is a branch of electrical engineering and        materials science involving components, devices and systems that        operate by modification of the optical properties of a material        by an electric field, thus it concerns the interaction between        the electromagnetic (optical) and the electrical (electronic)        states of materials    -   Fire control—The computer connection between the tracking optic        and the fire control trigger, located at the system operator        (HIL) console. The computer contains dozens of microprocessors        and electronic, electro-optic, and electro-mechanical components        that guide the release (firing) of the chosen countermeasure to        ensure an accurate engagement over great distances    -   Frequency—the rate at which a vibration occurs that constitutes        a wave, either in a material (as in sound waves), or in an        electromagnetic field (as in radio waves and light), usually        measured per second    -   Jam or Jammed or Jammers or Jamming—to interfere with or prevent        the clear reception of broadcast signals by electronic means to        become unworkable or to make unintelligible by sending out        interfering signals by any means    -   Laser—a device that emits light through a process of optical        amplification based on the stimulated emission of        electromagnetic radiation    -   Matrix—an environment in which something develops    -   Mobile Platform (MP)—the system installed on any vehicle with        the intent to move from one location to another location as        needed to fulfill a short-term need in the detection, tracking,        identification/classification and deterrence or interdiction of        a small unmanned aerial system (sUAS)    -   Modulation—the process of varying one or more properties of a        periodic waveform, called the carrier signal, with a modulating        signal that typically contains information to be transmitted    -   Multi-Band—a communication device that supports multiple radio        frequency bands    -   OTS—Off The Shelf refers to materials or equipment that        currently exists and is readily available for purchased or use    -   Permanent Platform (PP)—the system installed at a specific        location to fulfill a long-term need in the detection, tracking,        identification/classification and deterrence or interdiction of        a small unmanned aerial system (sUAS)    -   Pulse—a single vibration or short burst of sound, electric        current, light, or other wave    -   RPA—Remotely Piloted Aircraft, aka UAV, UAS    -   RF—Radio Frequency is a rate of oscillation in the range of        around 3 kHz to 300 GHz, which corresponds to the frequency of        radio waves, and the alternating currents that carry radio        signals    -   Target—something or someone of interest to be affected by an        action or development    -   Threat—a declaration or an act of an intention or determination        to inflict the destruction of property or harm, punishment,        injury or death of person(s)    -   UAS—Unmanned Aerial System, (aka UAV, RPA)    -   UAV—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, (aka UAS, RPA)    -   Uplink—the part of a network connection used to send, or upload,        data from one device to a remote device    -   Vector—a quantity having direction as well as magnitude,        especially as determining the position of one point in space        relative to another    -   Watt—the system unit of power, equivalent to one joule per        second, corresponding to the power in an electric circuit in        which the potential difference is one volt and the current one        ampere    -   Waveform—a graphic representation of the shape of a wave that        indicates its characteristics as frequency and amplitude.

While the invention has been described in connection with what ispresently considered to be the most practical and preferred embodiments,it is to be understood that the invention is not to be limited to thedisclosed embodiments, but on the contrary, is intended to cover variousmodifications and equivalent arrangements included within the spirit andscope of the appended claims.

1. A system for prohibiting an unmanned aerial vehicle continued flight,comprising: a radio receiver configured to receive radio signals toand/or from the unmanned aerial vehicle; a signal generator configuredto generate an amplified signal tailored to alter at least one of speed,direction, and altitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle; and a defensivenon-kinetic responder configured to generate, in response to a reactivethreat assessment for the unmanned aerial vehicle based at least in parton the received radio signals, a defensive non-kinetic response againstthe unmanned aerial vehicle to prohibit further flight of the unmannedaerial vehicle including selecting a direction of a directional radioantenna to thereby direct the amplified tailored signal toward theunmanned aerial vehicle and alter at least one of speed, direction,and/or altitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 2. The system of claim1, wherein the signal generator comprises a radio transmitter configuredto send radio transmissions to the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 3. Thesystem of claim 2, wherein the radio transmissions are configured toinclude an identified waveform to control the unmanned aerial vehicleand disrupt communication between the unmanned aerial vehicle and atleast one controller of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 4. The system ofclaim 1, further including at least one computing device configured tocompare a unique identifier associated with the unmanned aerial vehiclewith unique identifiers stored in at least one database.
 5. The systemof claim 4, wherein the at least one computing device is furtherconfigured to determine a Unique waveform to be used to interdict andcontrol the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 6. The system of claim 4, whereinthe at least one computing device is further configured to initiate aninterdict operation against the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 7. The systemof claim 4, wherein the at least one computing device is furtherconfigured to determine a distance and/or a direction to the unmannedaerial vehicle and/or determine a location of the unmanned aerialvehicle.
 8. The system of claim 4, wherein the at least one computingdevice is further configured to initiate a disabling countermeasureagainst the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 9. A method for prohibiting anunmanned aerial vehicle continued flight, comprising: receiving radiosignals to and/or from the unmanned aerial vehicle; generating anamplified signal tailored to alter at least one of speed, direction, andaltitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle; and generating, in response toa reactive threat assessment for the unmanned aerial vehicle based atleast in part on the received radio signals, a defensive non-kineticresponse against the unmanned aerial vehicle to prohibit further flightof the unmanned aerial vehicle, including selecting a direction of adirectional radio antenna and directing the amplified tailored signaltoward the unmanned aerial vehicle thereby altering at least one ofspeed, direction, and/or altitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle. 10.The method of claim 9, further comprising sending radio transmissions tothe vehicle.
 11. The method of claim 9, further comprising at least oneof: using an identified waveform to control the unmanned aerial vehicle,and disrupting communication between the unmanned aerial vehicle and atleast one controller of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 12. The method ofclaim 9, further comprising comparing a unique identifier associatedwith the unmanned aerial vehicle to identifiers stored in at least onedatabase.
 13. The method of claim 9, further comprising identifying aunique waveform for use in controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle. 14.The method of claim 9, further comprising initiating an interdictoperation against the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 15. The method of claim9, further comprising at least one of determining a distance to theunmanned aerial vehicle, determining a direction to the unmanned aerialvehicle, and determining a location of the unmanned aerial vehicle. 16.A method of claim 9, further comprising initiating a disablingcountermeasure against the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 17. A computerprogram product, comprising a computer readable hardware storage devicehaving computer readable programming code stored therein, said programcode comprising instructions executable to: receive radio signals toand/or from the unmanned aerial vehicle; generate an amplified signaltailored to alter at least one of speed, direction, and altitude of theunmanned aerial vehicle; and generate, in response to a reactive threatassessment for the unmanned aerial vehicle based at least in part on thereceived radio signals, a defensive non-kinetic response against theunmanned aerial vehicle to prohibit further flight of the unmannedaerial vehicle, including select a direction of a directional radioantenna and direct the amplified tailored signal toward the unmannedaerial vehicle thereby altering at least one of speed, direction, and/oraltitude of the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 18. The computer programproduct of claim 17, wherein the programming code further comprisesinstructions executable to send radio transmissions to the unmannedaerial vehicle.
 19. The computer program product of claim 17, whereinthe programming code further comprises instructions executable to atleast one of: use an identified waveform to control the vehicle, anddisrupt communication between the vehicle and at least one controller ofthe vehicle.
 20. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein theprogramming code further comprises instructions executable to compare aunique identifier associated with the unmanned aerial vehicle to aplurality of unique identifiers stored on at least one database.
 21. Thecomputer program product of claim 17, wherein the programming codefurther comprises instructions executable to identify a waveform used tocontrol the unmanned aerial vehicle.
 22. The computer program product ofclaim 17, wherein the programming code further comprises instructionsexecutable to initiate an interdict operation against the unmannedaerial vehicle.
 23. The computer program product of claim 17, whereinthe programming code further comprises instructions executable to atleast one of determine a distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle,determine a direction to the vehicle and determine a location of theunmanned aerial vehicle.
 24. The computer program product of claim 17,wherein the programming code further comprises instructions to initiatea disabling countermeasure against the unmanned aerial vehicle.